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In an overlapping generations economy with endogenous income growth, I 
combine themes from the work of Cooper et al. (2001), Kapur (2005), and 
Eaton and Eswaran (2009) in order to provide an example of an economy 
whose  welfare  dynamics  are  non monotonic.  Particularly,  the  evolution  of 
workers’ welfare can be distinguished between two different regimes that arise 
naturally  during  the  process  of  economic  development.  At  relatively  early 
stages, status concerns are inactive and welfare increases following the rising 
consumption  of  normal  goods.  During  the  later  stages,  however,  workers 
engage in some type of status competition that does not allow consumption to 
improve well being: their welfare actually declines as successive generations of 
workers increase their labour effort at the expense of leisure.  
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1   Introduction 
Does more income make people happier? Conventional economic modelling would provide 
an affirmative reply. People enjoy utility by satisfying their need to consume goods and 
services. A rise in income allows consumers to acquire more of their desired goods and 
services and, therefore, improves their welfare. Furthermore, a positive propensity to save 
implies that higher income leads to an increase in savings which, in a dynamic setting, can 
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improve  welfare  over  many  periods  as  it  increases  the  resources  available  for  future 
consumption. 
     If the above reasoning is always correct then the significant increase in real GDP per 
capita, in countries that have gone through (or still undergo) a process of uninterrupted 
economic growth, should be accompanied by analogous improvements in the overall well 
being of their populations. Alas, notwithstanding the obvious difficulties in constructing a 
concrete  measure  of  happiness,  many studies  and  opinion  polls that  have  tried to  trace 
changes of perceived happiness in countries that experience positive per capita GDP growth 
produce  results  that  are  not  as  straightforward  as  conventional  wisdom  suggests  (e.g., 
Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; BBC, 2006; 
van der Bergh, 2009). There are instances where happiness indices have remained still or 
even declined, while in cases where these indices show an upward trend, the improvement is 
not as high as one would expect given the significant increase in available resources.
1  
     Even if one decides to focus in cases where the relationship appears to be positive, a 
recent analysis by Kahneman et al. (2006) sheds some doubt on both its magnitude and on 
the robustness of its positive sign. They report results of a study in which higher income is 
strongly correlated with such negative feelings as anxiety and anger whereas its correlation 
with  experienced  happiness  is  weak.  Following  this  observation  the  authors  argue  that 
people may actually exaggerate when evaluating the contribution of income towards their 
overall  well being.  One  explanation  is  that  “when  someone  reflects  on  how  additional 
income  would  change  subjective  well being,  they  are  probably  tempted  to  think  about 
spending  more  time  in  leisurely  pursuits  such  as  watching  a  large screen  plasma  TV  or 
playing golf,  but  in  reality  they  should  think  of  spending  a  lot  more  time  working  and 
commuting and a lot less time engaged in passive leisure” (Kahneman et al., 2006; p.1910).  
     Such arguments reveal that the aspect of time allocation and its relation with changes in 
income is pertinent to the welfare implications of economic growth, given that leisurely 
pursuits may have a significant contribution towards overall life satisfaction. The relevance 
becomes more transparent once we consider the studies of Schor (1992), Burtless (1999) and 
Frank (2000) who provide evidence to support their claim that the uninterrupted increase in 
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average GDP per capita experienced by the United States has been accompanied by an 
increase  in  labour  time  and  a  corresponding  decline  in  leisure  activities  for  American 
workers. Naturally, one would like to examine whether there are any fundamental causes for 
the apparent decline in leisure and the increase in working effort during the later stages of an 
economy’s development process? Although many factors may be jointly responsible, Schor 
(1992) and Frank (2000) seem to make a connection to the idea that some consumption 
choices are not governed by the need to consume per se; instead, they are driven by people’s 
tendency to compare their circumstances against the circumstances of others and their inner 
desire to be better positioned, or at least as equal, as a result of this comparison. Indeed, 
there is sufficient evidence (e.g., Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; Luttmer, 2005; Heffetz and 
Frank, 2008) to support the view that status or positional concerns are major determinants 
of people’s choices and actions. 
     In this paper, I draw upon the theoretical work of Cooper et al. (2001), Kapur (2005), and 
Eaton and Eswaran (2009)  so  as  to provide an example  of  an  economy whose welfare 
dynamics  are  non monotonic  along  the  process  of  (endogenous)  income  growth  –  an 
example  motivated  by  the  arguments  developed  in  the  preceding  paragraphs.  The  next 
Section discusses the basic idea and the driving mechanisms of my results in relation to 
existing theoretical results on the possibility of non monotonic welfare dynamics. In Section 
3, I describe the characteristics of the economy and in Section 4 I impose the condition that 
allows  income  to  increase  constantly  through  endogenous  growth.  Section  5  solves  the 
individuals’ optimal problem and derives the equilibrium allocations while Section 6 presents 
the main results concerning the dynamics of welfare as income rises over time. I Section 7, I 
conclude.     
                     
2   Related Literature and an Overview of the Results  
The apparent lack of clear trends in the relationship between income and happiness – both 
within single  countries  and  across  nations  –  has  attracted, as  expected,  the  attention  of 
theorists.  In  response,  a  number  of  theoretical  analyses  have  provided  examples  that 
illustrate how and why conventional held views about the income happiness nexus may not 
actually hold.  
     De  la  Croix  (1998)  incorporates  a  social  norm,  which  is  related  to  past  levels  of 
consumption,  in  a  Ramsey type  economy.  In  this  setting,  he  illustrates  examples  where   4 
steady state utility does not respond to changes in consumption. In terms of transitional 
dynamics, the model is able to reproduce cases where welfare is actually declining. In his 
model, Peng (2008) introduces the concept of relative deprivation – i.e., the idea that a 
person’s utility is negatively affected by the existence of agents with greater wealth – in an 
endogenous growth model with income inequality. He finds that, when the weight of this 
negative externality is sufficiently strong, welfare may decrease over time despite the fact that 
income grows constantly.  
     As mentioned previously, my model borrows themes from the theoretical analyses of 
Cooper et al. (2001), Kapur (2005), and Eaton and Eswaran (2009) so as to provide a novel 
example  of  non monotonic  welfare  dynamics.  In  Cooper  et  al.  (2001)  individuals  have 
preferences over normal and status goods. Although only the former have the potential to 
increase  utility  in  equilibrium,  resources  are  diverted  towards  innovative  activities  that 
increase the quality of the status goods. As this happens, consumers spend less of their 
income  in  the  consumption  of  normal  goods  –  a  situation  that  may  eventually  lead  to 
negative utility growth. Their model, whereas a dynamic one, abstracts from the dynamics of 
output: there is not any form of capital, output is constant every period and equal to the 
(fixed) amount of unskilled labour. Consequently, any intertemporal change occurs solely as 
a result of innovations that alter the quality of goods and the fraction of skilled labour 
devoted to the R&D sector of each industry. Thus, their model cannot account explicitly for 
the simultaneous correlation of welfare with changes in aggregate income.  
     Kapur  (2005)  assumes  preferences  for  leisure,  normal  goods  and  status  good  in  a 
Ramsey type economy where growth is exogenous. The way that status goods are introduced 
in the utility function differs from Cooper et al. (2001). In equilibrium, a rise in the growth 
rate increases the utility from the consumption of both normal and status goods but it is also 
responsible for an increase in labour and a corresponding decline in leisure. As a result, a 
higher growth rate has conflicting effects on utility – implying that faster income growth 
may, under some circumstances, cause a reduction in welfare. However, the author does not 
provide  a  formal  exposition  of  a  scenario  where  the  negative  effect  dominates.  More 
importantly,  the  relationship  between  welfare  and  the  rate  of  income  growth  is  not  as 
informative on the correlation between welfare and income levels as we may presuppose it 
to be. If, for example, these conflicting effects are balanced at a utility maximising growth   5 
rate then welfare maximisation is still compatible with a scenario at which income increases 
constantly over time. 
     The  endogenous  labour leisure  choice  within  a  model  where  agents  choose  between 
normal  and  status/positional  goods  is  a  theme  also  utilised  in  a  model  by  Eaton  and 
Eswaran (2009). Their model is a static one, therefore there is no capital and production 
takes place solely through labour. The authors undertake numerical simulations to examine 
the welfare effects generated by permanent shifts in productivity (i.e., the wage per unit of 
labour). They find that these can be non monotonic because, although higher productivity 
increases the consumption of both status and normal goods, leisure may actually decrease 
for sufficiently high values of productivity.        
     The model that I will present in the following Sections is built upon a discrete time 
overlapping generations setting. Workers/savers decide optimally on how to allocate their 
time between labour and leisure – as in Kapur (2005) and Eaton and Eswaran (2009) – when 
young and on how to allocate their retirement income between the consumption of normal 
and positional (or status) goods when old.
2 The incorporation of positional goods in the 
utility function follows the manner of Cooper et al. (2001). The growth rate is endogenously 
sustained, by capital accumulation, and positive – meaning that income increases constantly 
over time. In equilibrium, the optimal allocations behave differently depending on whether 
the economy’s resources are below or above an endogenously determined threshold level for 
the  stock  of  physical  capital.  Below  this  threshold,  the  status  motive  is  inactive,  agents 
devote  their  entire  income  towards  the  consumption  of  normal  goods  and  leisure  is 
constant. When the economy surpasses this threshold, however, the status motive becomes 
active: individuals consume both types of goods but only the consumption of positional 
goods increases with income. The consumption of normal goods is constant and, at the 
same time, individuals respond to higher income by devoting more time towards labour and 
less time engaging in leisure activities.  
     Given these results, I derive two regimes concerning the relationship between income 
and welfare in a growing economy. Initially, as the status motive is inactive and leisure is 
constant, any change in the welfare of successive generations results from changes in the 
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consumption  of  normal  goods  –  therefore,  the  increase  in  income  is  associated  with 
improvements in welfare. Nevertheless, the economy keeps growing and at some point the 
status motive will be activated: from that moment onwards, given that the consumption of 
normal goods is constant, any change in welfare emerges solely as a by product of changes in 
leisure activities. Since leisure time responds negatively to income, the welfare of successive 
generations declines as income levels rise constantly over time.    
     The idea that preferences for status may generate a negative sign on the income welfare 
relationship through the behaviour of leisure is by no means a new one. Nevertheless, the 
emergence of an endogenous threshold that governs the extent of status seeking behaviour 
and, correspondingly, the different patterns of consumption, work and leisure in different 
stages of development – thus leading to inverse U shaped welfare dynamics – is, to the best 
of my knowledge, a novelty. Hence, it represents the paper’s main contribution.                              
                  
3   The Economy 
I construct an overlapping generations economy in which time takes the form of discrete 
periods. These are indexed by  0,1,2,... t =  while, in each period, there are two groups of 
agents inhabiting the economy – ‘workers/savers’ and ‘entrepreneurs’. At the beginning of a 
period, a mass of each group comes into existence. The sizes for both groups of agents are 
normalised to unity.  
 
3.1   Preferences 
Workers/savers (indexed by  i ) live for two periods. When born, they are endowed with a 
unit  of  time  (or  effort)  which  they  allocate  between  leisure  activities,  denoted  , i t l ,  and 
labour, denoted  , i t n . Therefore,  
  , , 1 i t i t n l + = .  (1) 
     Their labour is supplied to entrepreneurs and it yields a real wage of  t w  per unit of 
working time. Allocating their time between work and leisure is the only decision they make 
when  young.  Their  consumption  choices  occur  during  their  retirement  period.  For  this 
reason, they deposit their entire wealth to a financial intermediary which, next period, pays it 
back augmented by the gross real interest rate  1 t r + . Subsequently, they decide how to allocate   7 
their income between the consumption of normal goods, denoted  , 1 i t c + , and the acquisition 
of positional (or status) goods, denoted  , 1 i t x + , given the budget constraint  
  , 1 1 , 1 1 , i t t i t t t i t c p x r w n + + + + + = ,  (2) 
where  1 t p +  is the price of the positional good.  
     All choices are governed by the lifetime utility function  
  ( )
1
, , , 1 , 1 1
α β α β
i t i t i t i t t u l c ψ x X
- -
+ + + = + - ,  (3) 
where,  , (0,1) α βÎ  and  0 ψ > .
3 The presence of the term  1 t X +  is crucial in characterising 
goods as ‘status’ or ‘positional’. Particularly, this term is equal to the average consumption of 
positional goods by workers, i.e.,  
 
1
1 , 1 0 t i t X x di + + =∫ .  (4) 
This implies that the consumption of positional goods will result in utility increments as long 
as a worker’s consumption is above the relevant average of her peers.
4 
     Entrepreneurs (indexed by  j ) live for only one period. Each one is endowed with a 
technology through which she can produce a specific variety  j  of an intermediate product 
under monopolistically competitive conditions. They earn a real profit of  , j t ̟  from this 
activity which they consume at the end of the period. For simplicity, I will assume that 
entrepreneurs  are  not  affected  by  status  considerations  and,  thus,  they  only  care  about 
consuming a quantity of normal goods according to a utility function  , j t u  which is increasing 
in their consumption. Hence, maximising utility corresponds to profit maximisation.           
 
3.2   Technologies and Production 
As stated previously, each entrepreneur is endowed with a technology that allows her to 
produce a specific variety  j  of an intermediate product. Specifically, she can combine labour 
                                                 
3 The particular manner through which positional goods are introduced in the utility function implies that, 
effectively, workers engage in a status game against their peers. As in Cooper et al. (2001) the presence of the 
positive parameter  ψ  ensures that the “reaction functions are everywhere properly defined” (Cooper et al., 
2001; p.649).  
4 This assumption is supported by empirical studies. For example, in the experiment conducted by Solnick and 
Hemenway (1998), more than half of the participants responded that they would prefer a situation in which 
their annual income is higher relative to others compared to a situation in which their income is below the 
average, despite the fact that the second scenario involved much higher income and purchasing power in 
absolute terms.    8 
from young workers,  , j t N , and capital from financial intermediaries,  , j t K , so as to produce 
, j t Y  units of an intermediate product according to  




jt j t t j t Y K N
-
= ,  (5) 
where  0 1 γ < < . The variable  Γt  indicates some type of labour augmenting technological 
progress. Following Frankel (1962) I assume that this is related to the aggregate capital 














= >    
  ∫ .  (6) 
     Denote  the  wage  by  t w ,  the  price  of  capital  by  t r ,  the  marginal  cost  of  producing 
intermediate goods by  t m  and the price of intermediate products by  , j t ρ . Cost minimisation 
results in  
 
1
, , (1 ) Γ
γ γ γ
t t j t j t t w m γ K N
- - = - ,  (7) 
and  




t t j t t j t r m γK N
- - = ,  (8) 
while (7) and (8) imply that entrepreneurial profit is equal to  
  , , , ( ) j t j t t j t ̟ ρ m Y = - .  (9) 
     The entrepreneur sells her product to firms who produce the economy’s two types of 
final goods – the normal good (indexed by C ) and the positional good (indexed by X ). The 
respective technologies are given by   
 
1 1 1




C t C j t Q q dj
- -  
=  
  ∫ ,  (10) 
and   
 
1 1 1




X t X j t Q q dj
- -  
=  
  ∫ ,  (11) 
where  1 σ >   is  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  different  varieties  of  intermediate 
inputs.       
     Let us assume that the basic good is the numéraire and that all final goods firms operate 
under perfect competition. Profit maximisation leads to the demand functions    9 
  , , , ,
σ
C j t j t C t q ρ Q




, , , ,
σ σ
X j t j t t X t q ρ p Q
- - = .  (13) 
     Given that  , , , , , j t C j t X j t Y q q = + , we can substitute (12) and (13) in (9) and solve for the 
price that maximises entrepreneurial profits. It can be easily established that this equals  







,  (14) 
i.e., the price is set as a mark up over the marginal cost of production. Equation (14) also 
reveals a well known outcome associated with monopolistic competition, i.e., the symmetric 
equilibrium. That is,  , j t t ρ ρ j = " . Therefore,  , j t t K K = ,  , j t t L L =  and  , j t t Y Y =  for every  j .        
     Denote the aggregate price index by  





t j t ρ ρ dj
- - = ∫ .  (15) 





j t ρ dj
- = ∫ .  (16)  
A similar procedure for equations (11) and (13) results in  
  ( )




j t t ρ dj p
-
- - = ∫ .  (17)  
Combining the results from (16) and (17) gives us the price of positional goods as  
  1 t p = ,  (18)  
while substitution of (16) in (15) leads to  
  1 t t ρ ρ = = ,  (19)  
which is the equilibrium value of the aggregate price index for intermediate goods.  
     Substituting (19) in (14) gives us  ( 1)/ t m σ σ = -  – a result which can be used together 
with the symmetry conditions in (7) and (8), in order to obtain the values for the wage and 





t t t t
σ
w γ K N
σ
- - -
= - ,  (20) 
and    10 









= ,  (21) 




t t ̟ Y
σ
= .  (22) 
 
4   Balanced Growth 
Given  that  the  analysis  is  concerned  with  the  issue  of  welfare  dynamics  in  a  growing 
economy, I need to impose a condition that will, first of all, guarantee that the economy 
attains a constant growth rate for output. In the context of this model, a necessary restriction 
for  balanced  growth  is  to  set  1 θ =   in  equation  (6)  (see  Aghion  and  Howitt,  1998). 
Henceforth, I assume that this condition holds. 
     Now, we can derive the implications for output dynamics through 
 
Lemma 1. Assume that 
1 [(1 )Γ ( 1)/ ] 1
γ γ σ σ
- - - >  holds. Then the economy’s capital stock and output 
grow constantly at a rate  0 g > , i.e.,  1 1 / / 1 t t t t Y Y K K g + + = = +  therefore  1 t t Y Y + > ,  1 t t K K + >  for 
every  0 t ³ .  
 
Proof. We know that workers’ savings provide the resources through which capital formation 
takes place over time. Thus,  
 
1 1
1 , , 0 0 t t i t t i t K w n di w n di + = = ∫ ∫ . 
Given the labour market clearing condition 
1 1
, , 0 0 j t t i t N dj N n di = = ∫ ∫ , this expression can be 
rewritten as 
  1 t t t K w N + = . 














= - = + , 
where 
1 (1 )Γ ( 1)/ 1
γ g γ σ σ
-   = - - -   .  Now,  move  equation  (5)  one  period  forward  and 











+ + = ⇒ = . 
Consequently, we have 
  1 (1 ) t t Y g Y + = + . 
Given 
1 (1 )Γ ( 1)/ 1
γ γ σ σ
-   - - >   , it is  0 g >  therefore  1 t t Y Y + >  and  1 t t K K + > .   ■        
 
5   Optimal Allocations 
The problem of a worker/saver is to allocate her unit of time between work and leisure and 
her entire retirement income between the consumption of normal and positional goods in an 
optimal fashion. This entails that she maximises lifetime utility, given in (3), subject to the 
constraints in (1) and (2) and the non negativity constraints  , , 1 , 1 , , 0 i t i t i t l c x + + ³ . The first 




, 1 , 1 , 1




i t t t i t t i t
βr w α
l










, 1 1 1 , 1 , 1
1




i t t t t i t t i t
βp α β
x
ψ x X r w l p x
+
+
+ + + + +
- -
£ ³
+ - - -
,  (24) 
together with the budget constraint  , 1 1 , 1 1 , (1 ) i t t i t t t i t c p x r w l + + + + + = - . 
     It should be evident that the optimal solutions are symmetric – i.e., the same for every 
individual indexed by  i . For this reason, this subscript will be dropped in the subsequent 
analysis. From (23) we can also see that  0 t l =  cannot be an equilibrium as this will violate 
the  complementary  slackness  condition.  Therefore,  equation  (23)  holds  with  equality. 
Nevertheless, as we will see, the same does not apply for equation (24). To clarify this point, 
we can solve for  1 t x +  and substitute (18) to get  
  1 1 1
1
(1 ) ( )
1 1
t t t t t
α β β




³ - - -
- -
.  (25) 
Given the symmetric equilibrium and equation (4), it is  1 1 t t x X + + = . Substituting this result 
back in (25) and rearranging yields  
  1 1 (1 )
1
t t t t
βψ
x r w l
α β
+ + ³ - -
- -
.  (26)   12 
     The above result allows us to establish  
 




0,     
0,     
t t
t t
x if κ κ











Proof.  When  1 t κ κ + > ɶ ,  the  right  hand  side  of  (26)  is  positive.  This  implies  that  1 0 t x + >  
because, otherwise, the complementary slackness condition would be violated. In the case 
where  1 t κ κ + £ ɶ, however, the right hand side of (26) is not positive. As a result, the only 
solution is  1 0 t x + =  because, otherwise, the complementary slackness condition would imply 
that  1 t x +  is negative, thus violating the non negativity constraint on the variable.   ■       
  
     Obviously,  the  composite  term  1 t κ +   corresponds  to  a  worker’s  lifetime  income. 
Therefore,  we  can  see  that  the  status  motive,  despite  being  inherent  in  the  agent’s 
preferences,  becomes  active  only  when  a  sufficient  amount  of  income  is  available  for 
consumption. Otherwise, the individual devotes her entire wealth to the consumption of 
normal goods.    
     The previous analysis provides a hint on the fact that the economy’s resources, in terms 
of the physical capital’s stock, can be crucial in determining the consumption profile that is 
optimally chosen by workers. Furthermore, it will become clear that resource endowments 
are also crucial in determining the optimal behaviour of individuals in terms of their chosen 
time allocation between labour and leisure. All these issues are formally described in  
 
Proposition 1. There exists a threshold  0 K > ɶ  such that  
 
1




0,  Γ ( ), 
1
Γ ,  ,  ( )
1 1
γ
t t t t t t
γ
t t t t t t
σ α
x c γ K C K l l if K K
σ α β
σ βψ βψ
x γ K c c l L K if K K
σ α β α β
-
+ + + +
-
+ + +
-  = = = = = £  +  

 -  = - = = = >
- - - -  
ɶ
ɶ
,   13 
 where  2
(1 )
( )





αψ γ α β γ g K
-
=
- + - - +
 ,  ( ) 0 L¢ × <  and  ( ) t L K l < ,  1 ( ) t C K c + £ . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.   ■     
 
     The results from Proposition 1 have equipped as us with the necessary elements so as to 
examine the dynamics of welfare during the process of economic growth. This is a task 
undertaken in the following Section. 
 
6   Economic Growth and Welfare Dynamics 
The analysis of welfare dynamics is straightforward once we substitute the solutions from 
Proposition 1 into the lifetime utility function given in (3). Before doing so, however, we will 
make use of  
 
Lemma  3.  Assume  that  0 K K < ɶ .  Then,  there  is  a  time  period  2 T ³ ,  such  that 
0 1 T T K K K K - < < < ɶ .  
 
Proof. This is a straightforward outcome related to fact that, by Lemma 1, the economy grows 
constantly over time.   ■ 
 
     We are now able to derive the main result of the paper which comes in the form of 
 
Proposition 2. Assume that  0 K K < ɶ . Then, despite the fact that income grows constantly, the dynamics 
of welfare are not monotonic. The welfare of successive generations of workers improves for some periods but, 
subsequently, it declines constantly over time.    
 
Proof. Let us revisit Lemma 3 and focus, initially, on  [0, 1] t T Î - . Obviously,  t K K < ɶ  in 







α γ α β
t t
σ




-   =  
 
.   14 















By Lemma 1, it is  1 t t K K + >  therefore,  1 t t u u - > .  
     Now, let us focus on  [ , ) t T Î ¥ . Given that  t K K > ɶ , substitution of the corresponding 
solutions to the lifetime utility function leads to 
  [ ]
1 ( )
α β α β
t t u L K c ψ
- - = . 
Writing this in terms of  1 t +  and dividing by parts yields   
 











Since  ( ) 0 L¢ × < , it is  1 ( ) ( ) t t L K L K + < , therefore  1 t t u u + < .   ■  
      
     For  0,..., 1 t T = - , during which the level of income is relatively low, individuals find 
optimal to consume only normal goods because the utility return on positional goods is not 
sufficient enough. During this stage, the increase in income supports welfare improvements 
for successive generations of workers because they are able to increase the consumption of 
goods with intrinsic utility value. As income grows and people become richer, however, they 
find optimal to start engaging in some type of positional competition with their peers. Thus, 
for periods  , 1,... t T T = + , the demand for positional goods increases with income – for 
both the individual and the other members of the reference group. Given the nature of 
positional  goods,  and  as  illustrated  in  (23),  individuals  respond  by  diverting  even  more 
resources  away  from  the  consumption  of  normal  goods  –  whose  demand  comes  to  a 
standstill – in order to keep up with the status competition. Individuals support this futile 
quest for status by devoting more effort for work at the expense of their leisure. Hence, 
during this later stage of the development process, the successive generations of workers 
face a decline in the time available for pursuing leisurely activities – a decline that lowers 
welfare despite the continuing increase in income levels.   
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7   Conclusion 
In this paper, I have presented an example of an economy in which the evolution of welfare 
can be distinguished between two different regimes that arise naturally during the process of 
development.  Particularly,  I  constructed  an  economy  whose  welfare  dynamics  admit  an 
inverse U shape over time. Given that the non monotonic evolution of welfare arises in an 
economy that can (endogenously) sustain a positive rate of economic growth may partially 
explain the apparent inconclusiveness of empirical research on the income happiness nexus. 
Hence, the model’s results have some explanatory power on why (other things being equal) 
there  may  not  be  a  clear cut  relationship  between  income  and  happiness,  either  on  an 
individual country basis over time or among different countries, with different levels of per 
capita GDP, at a given moment in time.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Substituting (1), (21), the labour market equilibrium condition  t t n N =  and  1 t t t K w N + =  
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Therefore, using  1 (1 ) t t K g K + = +  and 
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such that, for  t K K £ ɶ , we have  1 0 t x + =  and  
 
1
1 1 1 1 1
1
(1 ) Γ ( )
γ
t t t t t t t t t
σ
c r w l r w N γ K C K
σ
-
+ + + + +
-
= - = = = .   


























which we can substitute, together with (18), in the budget constraint to get  
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Multiply both sides with 
1
1 t l -
, use (1), (20), (21), 
1 (1 )Γ ( 1)/ 1
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-   = - - -   ,  t t n N =  
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. 
Now, it is straightforward to substitute  t K K = ɶ  above in order to establish that  







Since  ( ) 0 L¢ × <  we can see that  ( ) t L K l <  for  t K K > ɶ . Similarly, using  1 (1 ) t t K g K + = + , we 
can  establish  that,  for  t K K = ɶ ,  we  have  ( ) C c × = .  Therefore,  given  ( ) 0 C¢ × > ,  we  can 
establish that  1 ( ) t C K c + £  because  t K K £ ɶ .   ■         